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Fiscal Decentralization and Its Effect on Poverty
Evidence from Panel Data on the lower 48 American States
By: Nicholas Valaris

Abstract: This study examines the effect of local and state fiscal autonomy on the poverty rate in
the U.S. from 1980-2000. The findings are that the gap between own revenues and own
expenditures, known as Ve11ical Imbalances, has an optimal level at which the negative influence
on poverty is at its maximum. Shifts along the Vertical Imbalances curve towards the optimal
value cause reductions in the poverty rate by hlmdredths of a percent. Convergence towards the
optimal Vertical Imbalances value is still recommended as a reduction in poverty could be
achieved by incuning little to no economic cost.

Introduction
In recent years financial decentralization has become an increasingly popular method of

governance for nations of all types. This process, in which a central government confers greater
autonomy on its sub-national governments, is believed to lend itself to a number of desirable
)

outcomes. Political scientists and economists theorize that devolving authority over revenue
collection and/or expenditures leads to greater efficiencies on a number of fronts. For example,
fiscal decentralization has been recognized for its potential at combating poveliy and inciting
improvements in public services. Yet financial decentralization's purported benefits are
examined very differently depending on whether the context is a developing or developed nation.
When the country of concern is of third-world status, the question most often asked is how
financial decentralization would facilitate a reduction in poverty. Conversely, when a postindustrial country is the focus, academics are most interested in its effect on economic growth.
My objective is to examine whether or not this administrative approach has effectively decreased
poveliy rates in the United States in the years 1980-2000. Should financial decentralization's
potential for poverty reduction in Amelica be confirmed, the policy implications will be
considerable. Then, we could confidently prescribe it as a low-cost method by which a given
jurisdiction can lessen its number of citizens living in poverty. Such an option would be
especially attractive in the current economic climate, where a prolonged recession has depleted
many states' financial resources.
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Literature Review

Financial devolution has been conjectured to fight poverty in a number of ways. First, it
is thought to create an environment that is conducive for economic growth. Prevailing theory
holds that decentralized states have more flexibility in designing region-specific policies
concerning infrastructure and human capital investments, as well as the fiscal capacity to realize
them (Oates, 1999). More efficient investment strategies will greatly augment the capital base,
and facilitate accelerated economic growth. The "productivity enhancement" theory also features
improved public service provision and investment as an outcome. With responsibility for such
activities squarely on local governments, they are incentivized to minimize production costs and
make such activities as efficient as possible (McNab and Vazquez, 2003). As compelling as these
theories may be, we cannot draw any firm conclusions about the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth. Conjecture alone is of little use in the face of complex
real-world dynamics. Oates conditions all his arguments in favor of financial decentralization by
saying " ... all the potential ... for improving economic performance must be evaluated in terms of
the specific characteristics that characterize the current state of the developing nation" (Oates,
1999, P. 24). True to word, empirical analysis conducted on fiscal decentralization's contribution
to economic growth has offered no clear answers, but instead produced a great deal of
contradictory results.
Some studies on the nature ofthis relationship have found a negative correlation between
sub-national government autonomy and growth rates. Sixteen central and Eastern European
countries were examined in the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union in
order to determine whether they were benefitting from a decentralized administrative structure.
The findings showed that expenditures and transfers to sub-national governments had a soundly
negative correlation to national growth rates (Rodrigues-Pose and Kroijer, 2009). However, local
level taxes were found to have a statistically significant positive impact on the pace of economic
expansion. The authors note that their conclusions are consistent with other studies that have
analyzed financial decentralization implemented in developing countries. Specifically, they
attribute the negative correlations as the consequences of devolving authority to the local level
when municipal governments do not yet have the administrative capacity to efficiently serve
their populaces.

)

While fiscal devolvement may have been counterproductive for the former Eastern bloc
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countries, China has shown that a middle-income country can successfully enact this approach
and reap its benefits. Using a panel data set 30 Chinese provinces from 1994-2002, Ying Ding
regressed GPP (Gross Provincial Product) against an array of decentralization measures and
control variables. Ding grouped the provinces into three zones, the Eastern, Central, and
Western, which exhibit varying levels of industrialization and development. For all three, the
expenditure measure of decentralization was positively and significantly correlated (Ding, 2007).
The revenue measure was negative and insignificant for two of the three zones, though the author
attributed this result more to the faultiness ofthe indicator than to real-world trends. Regardless,
Ding's study is significant for demonstrating that financial decentralization has the potential to
accelerate growth for middle-income countries also.
An unequivocally positive connection between financial decentralization and economic

growth has been more consistently demonstrated when a developed economy is the object of
study. Akai and Sakata's research showed that after income distribution, the quality of human
capital, economic structure, region-specific characteristics, and a host of other factors had been
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controlled for, the more fiscally decentralized U.S. states experienced higher levels of economic
growth in recent decades (Akai and Sakata, 2002). In a follow-up study, Akai and Sakata set out
to find the exact channels through which financial decentralization facilitates economic growth.
They introduce the concept of "complementarity" , which expresses the ease with which a wellexecuted public output can compensate for an underperformi'n g project in a nearby jurisdiction.
When "local complementarity" (intra-regional) is sufficiently lower than "global
complementarity" (inter-regional), risk-sharing between local and central governments becomes
more advantageous (Akai, Sakata, and Nishimura, 2007). Then, the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth can be modeled as a parabola, the interior maximum of
which denotes an optimal level of decentralization with respect to growth. Using a panel data set
of the United States from the 1990s, the authors' empirical test validates their theoretical
framework. Going one step further, Akai, Sakata, and Nishimura calculate the location of the
fifty states on the parabola and determine that many of them could further decentralize to reach
the inflection point, and thus optimize growth.
Later studies validate the "hump shaped" relationship between faster economic growth
and financial decentralization on a broader scale. While examining all the OECD nations (except
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Luxembourg) over the span of 1970-2000, Ulrich Thiessen noticed that most member countries
had converged on a moderate level of fiscal decentralization. Ceteris parabus, states that had
achieved a balance of authority between central and local levels had higher overall growth rates,
higher figures for investment as a share of GDP, and larger Total Factor Productivity rates.
Conversely, countries situated at the extremes (very centralized or decentralized) experienced
lower rates of all three measures. The author's conclusion was that the parabola is a fitting
description for the interplay between growth and fiscal decentralization in developed countries,
though he qualifies the robustness of the findings by highlighting the weakness inherent in his
small sample size.
A legitimate question that arises in the discussion of governmental devolution is whether
localities with limited fiscal capacity can adequately function with greater autonomy. Critics
have speculated that such cities would allocate their expenditures toward fostering commercial
activity to the detriment of providing social services, if given free reign over their finances.
Lobao and Kraybill study the presence of a trade-off between these two objectives using panel
data on 46 U.S states from 1980-2005. They found no evidence that financial decentralization
precipitates increased expenditures on business attraction in poverty-stricken municipalities.
Even during the severe recession that followed 9111, poorer cities expanded their social service
provision in line with their richer counterparts (Lobao and Kraybill, 2009). The authors
concluded that no such reservations should be harbored concerning the fiscal empowerment of
economically depressed localities.
In addition to slowing down economic growth, poorly implemented fiscal
decentralization can cause other consequences as well. One study demonstrate that if
Intergovernmental Transfers from the Federal level become too large a share in state and local
expenditures, corruption among public officials increases. In this context, corruption is defined
as share of arrests of public officials due to charges of abuse of public office in total population.
The authors term the mismatch between own revenues and own expenditures as "vertical
imbalances". Their results show that a one standard deviation increase in vertical imbalances
causes a 40% standard deviation increase in corruption (Fisman and Gatti, 2002). The authors
speculate that this effect is induced by the officials now operating under a "soft budget
constraint". Politicians that are accustomed to a soft budget constraint may not be properly
incentivized to allocate resources efficiently, maximize the returns on their tax revenues, or

)
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evince any ofthe desirable characteristics that financial decentralization is thought to bring
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about. In this scenario, officials may be less responsible with public funds and take more liberties
with their position in general. Thus when the fiscal decentralization is extremely asymmetric in
nature, there is a higher likelihood that state and local officials will be corrupt.
In a similar vein, revenue decentralization has been shown to increase income inequality
in the presence of weak government. Bilin Neyapti explains that local government capture by the
interest groups that represent powerful firms can lead to inefficient revenue collection.
Influential economic agents use their grip on local authorities to avoid paying their share of
taxes. In this scenario, the middle and lower-income classes disproportionately bear the brunt of
financially supporting municipals governments (Neyapti 2006). The income inequality in such a
society thusly increases. However, this effect is reversed if revenue decentralization is
undertaken by a competent government. Presumably, local governments here are more immune
to the demands of powerful economic actors, and the latter does not exert as much of a
distortionary effect on the rest of society. When economic agents are contributing their fair share
to the local administration, revenue decentralization works to decrease income inequality.

)

Even if a nation or state achieves accelerated economic growth, that in itself is no
guarantee that its poverty rate will diminish. In his primer on growth and poverty reduction,
Martin Ravallion identifies the fundamental prerequisites of a pro-poor outcome. He notes the
essentially of "reducing the antecedent inequalities that limit the prospects for poor people to
share in the opportunities unleashed in a growing economy" (Ravallion, 2005, P. 20). This is
largely accomplished by changing the income distribution, which in tum hinges upon a host of
factors. One commonality Ravallion found across countries was a great disparity in levels of
geographic or sectoral growth. The author cautions against provinces, states, or localities being
left behind when their economic prospects do not coincide with national trends or goals. A propoor growth strategy will not neglect the less dynamic or industrialized regions of a country, but
devote sufficient attention to them in order that they can prosper as well. Devolving
administrative and fiscal authority to a given jurisdiction thus seems an effective way to ensure
that a locality's interests are furthered, and pro-poor growth achieved.
Economic growth aside, fiscal decentralization is believed to achieve a pro-poverty
outcome by other means also. Proponents hold that conferring greater autonomy on a state or city
leads to social service provision whose nature and structure more closely reflects local needs
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(Jutting, Corsi, and Stockmayer, 2005). Eliminating the gap between the administrators
responsible for the programs' execution and the intended recipients ensures that social services
are more responsive and better targeted (Jutting, Corsi, and Stockmayer, 2005). Additionally, the
output of public goods will correspond with the level of need for such resources in a fiscally
decentralized locale (Oates, 1995). This precludes the inevitable pitfalls that accompany a
centrally-planned approach. There, funds for public goods are distributed uniformly among the
recipients without regard for the severity of need of each. Invariably, the result is shortages and
surpluses among the lower level governments, which is unquestionably a sub-optimal outcome.
Lastly, fiscal decentralization is theorized to lead to a more economically equitable
society due to the increased political participation it engenders. Generally, the more
economically disenfranchised an individual, the less willing and able they are to press for their
needs and articulate their interests through the proper channels. A more autonomous local state
remedies this disconnect by bringing the lower classes into closer contact with the public
officials responsible for their welfare. Personal interaction between politician and citizen makes
the latter much more difficult to ignore. As the poor are now in a better position to express their
desires and affect change, their vulnerability and voicelessness are thought to drastically
diminish (Jutting, Corsi, and Stockmayer, 2005). Thusly politically empowered, lower socioeconomic classes can now advocate for higher-quality social services, more progressive laws,
and other measures that will help them escape from poverty.
Through all of the aforementioned channels, financial decentralization is theorized to lead
to a pro-poor outcome. My immediate aim is not to substantiate the existence of these separate
channels, but rather to show that their confluence has a net negative effect on poverty.
Specifically, I will show the existence of a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization
and poverty rates among the lower 48 United States.

Data
The United States of America provides ample material for a comprehensive case study in
the influence of decentralization on the level of poverty in a developed nation. Focusing on the
U.S. offers several advantages over cross-national data. First, to juxtapose countries with wildly
different levels of industrialization and economic maturity is to group together fundamentally
different units of observation. Doing so hinders any efforts to distinguish fiscal decentralizations '

)

unambiguous effect. Secondly, other papers examine time periods during which countries
experienced periods of rapid growth and activity. Akai and Sakata argue that fiscal
decentralization operates sub-optimally in such scenarios, which leads to distorted results (Akai
and Sakata, 2002). The relative political and cultural homogeneity of the United States, as well
as the many periods of moderate economic expansion it has experienced, allowed both ofthese
issues to be avoided in this investigation.
The highly varying degree of autonomy among state governments will allow us to
examine whether there exists a relationship between a state's governance structure and the
standard of living of its citizens. America also has the advantage of allowing political and
cultural factors to be safely controlled for. Their relative equality in terms of industrialization
and modernity also help ensure the robustness of the results. Simultaneously, the states exhibit a
sufficiently high degree of heterogeneity in poverty rates as well as in several measures of fiscal
decentralization. In addition, studying the American states also has the distinct advantage over
cross-national data sets in that variables are uniform in their definitions. For example, America
has utilized a single definition of the Poverty Rate since it began tracking such information.
Conversely, different nations may calculate their poverty rate using different measures. Studies
which aggregate data measured by various indicators into one measure will produce results that
are not as reliable. As the Table of Means indicates, there exists a huge range of both fiscal
autonomy and poverty among the United States.
Table 1:

Tables of Means
Standard"
Z~~
~
~""'~
Deviation .:

Fiscal Decentralization
Measure

Minimum

State Poverty Rate

2.9%
Connecticut - 1993

27.2%
Mississippi - 1994

13.2%

.040

Revenue Indicator

18.9%
Delaware - 1998

66.2%
Nebraska - 1982

39.6%

.080

Expenditure Indicator

21.3%
Wyoming - 1984

74.1%
Wisconsin - 1991

52.6%

.094

9.2%
Arizona - 1988

29.7%
Vermont - 1980

17.4%

.037

Vertical Imbalances

Maximum

~

81

P age

23%
Wyoming - 1994

63.5%
Delaware - 1993

48.3%

6.47%

3.3%
North Carolina - 1999

38.3%
West Virginia - 1981

15.3%

6.55%

$7,005
Mississippi - 1980

$41,920
Connecticut - 2000

$18,259

$6,169

34.8%
New Hampshire - 1987

51.8%
South Dakota - 1997

41.1%

2.9%

Share of Agricultural
Employment

17%
Delaware - 2000

1%
New Jersey - 1990

4.4%

3%

Share of Manufacturing
Employment

3.3%
Wyoming - 1984

27.5%
North Carolina - 1980

14%

5.3%

15.8%
South Carolina - 1980

43.3%
Nevada - 1981

26.3%

4.7%

-9.85

.755

-2.92

2.38

Human Capital Attainment

Union Member Density

Real Per Capita Gross State
Product
State GINI Coefficient

Share of Service Employment

Log of Corruption

This study utilizes U.S. Census panel data from the year 1980-2000. For each state it
reports own-tax revenues, intergovernmental transfers to the state and national level, ownexpenditures, and state and federally mandated expenditures for each year. This will allow the
construction of the fiscal decentralization indicators that will serve as my principal explanatory
variables. The Census also features tables of annualized poverty rates for all forty-eight states for
the aforementioned time span, thus providing the data for our dependent variable.
We follow previous studies for direction in which control variables to include in our
specifications. GINI coefficients are used to control for varying levels of income inequality
among the states. Ceteris paribus, we believe that income inequality will correlate positively with
poverty. The data for the GINI coefficients also originates from the U.S. Census. Real per capita
gross state product is included in order to control for varying standards of living. We theorize
that real per capita GSP will correlate negatively with poverty, as higher incomes necessarily
mean less people subsisting below the poverty line. Figures for nominal per capita were
extracted from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the converted into real terms with a GSP
deflator. I control for ,divergent education levels by including states' average high school
graduation rates. The level of human capital attainment is accompanied by a quadratic term in

)

order to account for formal education's non-linear relationship with poverty. We hypothesize
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that education will work to diminish poverty only after it has reached a certain point.
Accordingly, the level should be positive while the quadratic is negative. Estimates of state
graduation rates for some years were taken from the U.S. Census, with figures for all missing
years interpolated by Economist Mark W. Frank in one of his studies (Frank, 2009). Union
Member Density measures the strength of union presence for each state, the net effect of which
is unknown. Figures were taken from unionstats.com. The economic composition of a state is
controlled for with a host of sector employment measures. The employment share of
manufacturing, agriculture, and services in the total economy inform us as to which industries
increase or diminish poverty. Totals for each sector were divided by the employment total to
obtain the share, all of which was provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.

History of Fiscal Decentralization in America
The fiscal autonomy of a given unit of government has two principal dimensions:
revenue and expenditure decisions. The degree to which a government has discretion over those
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two aspects informs us as to how financially independent it is. With regard to revenues, local and
state governments have had command over as much as 66% oftheir income stream, and as little
as 19% over the twenty-one year period. However most states have gravitated towards the
average of 40%, as the standard deviation is only 2.3%. Collectively, the states experienced an
8% decline in revenue autonomy from 1980 to 2000, dropped from 40% revenue autonomy to
36%. There were 9 states that were driving this change especially strongly. Wyoming underwent
a dramatic 50% shift in revenue autonomy, starting at 41 % in 1980 and ending at 20% in 2000.
Vermont, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin also saw declines greater than 25%. Conversely, three
states decentralized significantly with respect to revenues: Indiana at 8%, Nevada at 10%, and
South Carolina at 25%. Examining the states within their respective census regions yields even
clearer insights into the trends of the recent past. The Midwest underwent an 11 % drop in
revenue autonomy, with nearly that entire decline taking place in the 1990s. The revenue
autonomy of the West rose in excess of 40% in the mid-1980s, remained constant for ten years,
and then dropped to 34% by 2000. The net change was a 9.5% decrease. The North East was
fairly static in this regard for most of the sample period, then saw a 9.5% drop in the last five
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years of the sample. The Southeast was stable throughout the 21 year time span, and is unique in
that it experienced minimal net change during the sample period.
The indicator for expenditure autonomy fluctuated much more wildly for sub-national
governments. The mean for the two decades was 53%, and the minimum and maximum were
21 % and 74%, respectively. The standard deviation of the expenditure autonomy indicator was
fairly large at 9%. The absolute value of the annual percent change in expenditure autonomy was
23%, which also informs as to its erratic nature. Collectively the states underwent an increase of
7% in expenditure autonomy from 1980 to 2000. Four states saw a drop of over 25%, including
Iowa, Kansas, Illinois, and Louisiana. Simultaneously, 11 states had their expenditure autonomy
increase by over 40%. Virginia was far and away the leader with a jump of 91 % in expenditure
autonomy. When broken down by census region, each of the four sectors demonstrates a distinct
trend in this regard. With respect to expenditure autonomy the Midwest fluctuated wildly, rising
as high as 60% in some years and falling as low as 40% in others. By the year 2000 it had settled
at 41 %, which equates to -12% shift. The evolution of expenditure autonomy was similar in the
Northeast, which oscillated in the range of 42%-60%. By the year 2000 it had command over
48% of its expenditures, which represents a 7% rise. The Southeast and West saw similar
movements of expenditure autonomy during these 21 years, and had increases of 14.5% and
4.5%, respectively.
Vertical Imbalances averaged 17.4% over the sample period, the maximum observed
value being 30% and the minimum 9.25%. The average standard deviation was 1.84%,
indicating the values were tightly clustered about the mean. The average annual percent change
was .4%, showing that changes in Vertical Imbalances occurred in small shifts. As a nation,
Vertical Imbalances was 11.16% lower than its 1980 value. The states most responsible for
spurring Virginia, Nevada, Delaware, and Massachusetts all experienced negative percent
changes in excess of 30% during the sample period. Nevada and Nebraska were outliers at the
other extreme, with positive percent changes in excess of 20%. In regional terms, the four census
territories took highly divergent paths with regard to vertical Imbalances. The Midwest had an
average value of 19% in 1980 and ended at 18% in 2000, which translates to a 4.8% decline.
Vertical imbalances in the Northeast began at 21.5%, sank to as low as 14.5% in the early 1990s
but rebounded to 17.5% by 2000. The net change in the Northeast was thus an 18.5% decrease
during the sample period. Vertical imbalances in the Southeast and West followed the same
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trajectory as in the Northeast, though its net change was smaller at a 10.5% and 13% decrease,
respectively.
The trends in fiscal decentralization we observe among the states and four census regions
are consistent with the findings of Wallis and Oates in their study "Decentralization of the Public
Sector: An Empirical Study of State and Local Government". First, these authors discovered that
fiscal decentralization increases with population size. Our anecdotal data substantiate this
assertion, with Delaware, North Dakota, and Idaho occupying spots in the bottom ten in rankings
of both population and revenue decentralization for 1980. Similarly, four states appear in the top
ten with regard to both population size and revenue decentralization in 1980, those being New
York, Texas, Illinois, and Florida. In 1990, we see that most of the same states have maintained
their position. Delaware, North Dakota, and Idaho are again in the bottom ten states with the
smallest population and least fiscally decentralized. Illinois, Florida, and New York are again
among the ten states with the highest populations and levels of revenue decentralization, with
Texas joining their rankings. The correlation between population size and revenue
decentralization appears to have strengthened with the passage oftime. In 2000, five states are in
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the bottom ten for both lists: Wyoming, Vermont, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Idaho.
Additionally, five were still in the top ten with respect to population and revenue
decentralization: Georgia, Illinois, Florida, New York, and Texas.
Wallis and Oates also find that higher income states are more centralized with respect to
their expenditures. Indeed, West Virginia and Kentucky are in the bottom ten states in terms of
real per capita income, but in the top ten states for expenditure decentralization in 1980. In 1990,
Louisiana, Kentucky, and Idaho are all in the bottom ten states for per capita income, but the top
ten states for expenditure decentralization. New Jersey and Virginia have two of the highest
standards of living of the 48 sample states, and are also among the least decentralized in
expenditures for 1990. In the year 2000, West Virginia, Alabama, and Utah are in the bottom ten
states with regard to real per capita income, as well as in the ten most decentralized states with
respect to expenditures. Illinois is the only state to appear in both the ten states with the highest
real per capita income and the smallest level of expenditure decentralization in 2000.
Lastly, Wallis and Oates discovered that Southern states are inherently more centralized,
especially compared to their northeastern counterparts.
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DeImition of Poverty

A crucial first step in any effort to improve the welfare of the poor in America is to
properly define poverty. Only then we can ascertain what proportion of the population is living
below an acceptable limit. The definition of poverty most commonly referenced, and the one I
use, is the u.s. Census Bureau's. The Census uses a set of money income thresholds that vary by
family size and composition to determine who falls below the poverty line. Households that
theoretically cannot meet their basic consumption needs, which include food and non-food
needs, are defined as living in poverty. Therefore, the poverty line can be thought of as being the
minimum expenditure necessary to meet basic food and non-food needs. The Census' poverty
thresholds were originally devised in 1963 using U.S. Department of Agriculture food budgets
calculated for families under economic duress. They then used other data to determine what
share of total expenditures food purchases are on average for American families. Combining this
information, the U.S. Census arrived at the definition of the poverty line that is still in effect.
This approach to discerning the extent of poverty in American is subject to a number of
criticisms, though. First, it fails to take into account the severity of poverty. Families could be
subsisting slightly below the threshold, indicating a moderate degree of poverty. They could also
be living in considerable deprivation far below the threshold, but there is no way of knowing
under the current guidelines. Secondly, the poverty line uses the household as its unit of
observation. Therefore, it implicitly assumes that poverty is uniformly distributed across a given
household. In instances in which the elderly, children, and females are treated unequally, they
would take on a disproportionate share of the poverty of that household. In this respect the
Census' poverty line also fails to capture the severity of poverty bourn by individuals. Third, the
poverty threshold does not vary geographically, despite the fact that price levels vary
considerably across different regions of the U.S. Consequently, the degree of poverty would be
far greater for a family living in a costlier locality, ceteris paribus.
The Census' poverty definition is thus severely flawed and subject to a great many
limitations. Its virtue is that there exists an abundance of data on it at the state level, which serves
my purposes well. The Census' definition is therefore my poverty measure of choice in this
study.

)
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Recent History of Poverty in America

From 1980 to 2000, the American states had an average poverty rate of 13.22%. The
figure in 1980 was 12.5% and in 2000 was 15.13%, which comes out to a 26% increase. The
average annual percent change was 2.3%, and the standard deviation was 2%. There were several
notable outlier states that we observed; for instance, Nevada, Wisconsin, and Connecticut
experience drops in their poverty rate of 20% or more. The states driving the general trend were
Minnesota, West Virginia, and New Hampshire, all of which had percent increases of70% or
higher. With regard to Census regions, all four underwent net increase in the poverty rate. The
Northeast's rate began at about 10% and held fairly constant until the last few years of the
sample, during which it climbed to 13%. Its net change was thus a 28% increase. The Midwest
began at 11.5% of its populace living under poverty, and spent the duration of the sample
fluctuating between 11-14.5%. It finally settled at 13.5%, which equates to a 14.5% increase.
The West had a starting poverty rate of 12.3%, which grew steadily until finishing at 15%. The
fraction of citizens living in poverty thus increased by 23%. The Southeast experienced the most
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dramatic shift of all: a 32.7% increase in the poverty rate. Its figure as of 1980 was already high
at 15%, and ended at about 20%.

Empirical Approach
In my most parsimonious model, I regress state poverty rates onto each of the six proxies
for financial decentralization. I then expand the model to include that proxy's quadratic term, as
well as control for a number of pertinent variables. Single variable or groups of like variables are
added in one at a time. For example, percentage of state population under the age of 19 and
percentage 65 or above enter into the model at once. I employ a two-way fixed-effects model for
every specification in order to control for state-specific characteristics that persist through time.
Year binary variables are utilized to control for time-specific shocks that would otherwise bias
my findings. The model is thus specified as
PRjt = bo + b1FDj + b2FDj2 +b 3 Xjt + (liSi + (ljY t + ejt.

Financial Decentralization Indicators
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In order to properly gauge the effects of financial decentralization, the first step is
necessarily to create a proxy or group of proxies that accurately indicate the degree of autonomy
a local government exercises. At first, it would seem intuitive to consider a municipality's share
of expenditures as a percent of total expenditure decisions as a measure of autonomy. Yet the
presence of intergovernmental grants (IGRs) precludes this approach (Akai and Sakata, 2002).
This is due to the fact that many IGRs are distributed to local governments with explicit
conditions on how they can be utilized. Expenditures made possible by federal money due not
reflect any decision-making on the part of a state government, and thus tell us nothing of its level
of autonomy. Alternatively, it may be tempting to regard a state's level of tax revenues as an
indicator of its financial independence. However unconditional lump-sum grants from the federal
or administration add considerably to a state government's budget, greatly augmenting its fiscal
independence (Akai and Sakata, 2002). Lump-sum grants therefore prevent tax revenues from
serving as an accurate measure of a state's autonomy.
One way to account for these distortions is to utilize several indices that inform us as to
the level of a state's financial autonomy. Indicator 1: The Revenue Indicator is the ratio oflocal
revenues to state and local government revenues combined (Akai and Sakata, 2002). The
underlying assumption of this indicator is that all IGRs are conditional and thus do not contribute
to a given state's fiscal independence (Akai and Sakata, 2002) Indicator 2: The Production
Indicator is the ratio of local government expenditure to combined state and local government
expenditure. The implicit assumption here is that the local government has complete autonomy
with respect to its expenditure decisions, i.e., that all IGRs are unconditional.
The last indicator I include is "Vertical Imbalances", the purpose of which is to gauge the
overall autonomy achieved by a locality. It captures the gap between a locality'S expenditures
and own revenues, with the difference being made up by federal intergovernmental grants.
Accordingly, vertical imbalances are calculated as federal IGRs / combined state and local
expenditures. Fishman and Gatti hypothesize that the larger the rift between own revenues and
expenditures, the higher the likelihood of corruption and the less effective financial
decentralization will be (Fishman and Gatti, 2001). This indicator will allow us to determine
whether states and towns that decentralized symmetrically do indeed enjoy financial
decentralization's theoretical benefits.
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Results
Preliminary Results

Many of the states in our sample exhibit trends in the financial decentralization indicators
that correspond to increases or drops in the poverty rate that conform to our hypotheses. For
example, Florida began in 1980 with a Vertical Imbalances value of 18.8%, which steadily
decreases to 10.5% by 1991. During the same period, the poverty rate jumps from 11.6% to
15.5%. This increase makes sense in light of the fact that the state and local governments have
less access to federal funds. Michigan had a revenue decentralization value of 43.6% in 1991
which shrank to 36.5% by 2000. A movement towards the poverty-maximizing revenue
decentralization value of37% should increase a given state's poverty rate. Indeed, Florida's
poverty rate grew from 13.3% to 16.2%. Mississippi began the sample period with a Vertical
Imbalances value of23%, which is very close to the optimal value (20.7). By 1990, Mississippi's
Vertical Imbalances had diminished to 15%. Simultaneously, revenue decentralization decreased
from 48% to 43.4%. Both of these shifts should theoretically lead to an increase in poverty, and

}

we do see the poverty rate go from 12.2% to 15.7%.
Nebraska was an outlier in that it had the highest average for revenue decentralization
from 1980-2000. In 1982 it had a value of66.25%, which diminished to 53.75% by 1997. Its
Vertical Imbalances value in 1989 was 11.75% and grew to 15.8% by 2000. These movements in
fiscal decentralization counteract one another, and the net effect on the poverty rate is
indeterminate a priori. Indeed, Nebraska's poverty rate fluctuated about its mean of 11.25%
during the twenty-one year sample period. Lastly, New Jersey went from being 43.25% revenue
decentralized to 37.7% (the poverty-maximizing value) by 1989. Vertical balances decreased
from 16.3% to 11.9% during that time. Accordingly, the poverty rate rose from 8% in 1980 to
10.3% in 1990.
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Table 2: Estimate of the Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Poverty
Dependent Variable: State Poverty Rate, 1980-2000

Intercept

(1)

(2)

(3)

-7.06*
(3.62)

-2.68
(3.31)

-.990
(3.60)

Revenue Indicator

21.4***
(8.25)

Revenue Indicator2

-28.1 ***
(10.4)
-1 .09**
(.541)

Expenditure Indicator
Vertical Imbalances

-26.7*
(15.1)

Vertical Imba1ances2

74.2*
(39.7)

Log of Real Per Capita GSP

-.0003***
(.00006)

-.0003***
(.00006)

-.0003***
(.00006)

Share of Agricultural
Employment

-9.16***
(2.47)

-8.96***
(2.46)

-9.80***
(2.45)

-3.14
(1.95)

-3.55*
(1.93)

-2.98
(1.95)

-6.05*
(3.65)
-.063***
(.024)

-.075***
(.024)

-.070***
(.024)

GINI Coefficient

6.70**
(3.05)

6.65**
(3.06)

7.34**
(3.09)

Log of Corruption

.046*
(.027)
.469***
(.026)
.192***
(.026)
48.1 ***
11.8
-54.3***
(12.7)
1.0e+03

.054**
(.027)
.475***
(.026)
.194***
(.026)
48.3***
(11.7)
-55.04***
(12.6)
1.0+03

.047*
(.027)
.460***
(.026)
.184***
(.026)
50.3***
(11.7)
-58.2***
(12.6)
1.0e+03

Share of Manufacturing
Employment
Share of Service Employment
Union Member Density

Lag 1 of Poverty
Lag 2 of Poverty
Human Capital Attainment
Human Capital Attainment2
Number of Instruments
Number of Observations

912

912

912

d
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2805.76

2749.28

I P age

2815.68

Notes to Table 2: Standard errors in parenthesis. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor
and Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the Current Population Survey, and include all the
lower 48 states between the years 1980-2000. Each regression includes binary variables for each sample
state, as well as for each year
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The negative coefficient on vertical imbalances (-.519) along with the positive coefficient on
vertical imbalances squared (1.22) inform us that this variable exhibits a parabolic shape when
graphed against the poverty rate. I calculate the inflection point to be .213, or 21.3 %. At this
minimum, symmetric financial decentralization exerts its strongest negative effective on the
Poverty Rate. To give a quantitative example, a given state that moves from 0% Vertical
Imbalances to the optimal value would experience an approximately -.05% decrease on its
poverty rate.
Many of the control variables I included also became increasingly significant as I further
specified my model. Share of Agriculture in total employment was negative and significant at the
1% level (, showing that states with agricultural sectors had slightly lower poverty rates.
Conversely, employment share of manufacturing and service were negative and significant at the
1% and 5% level, respectively. Unemployment rate was negative and significant at the 1% level,
which contradicts economic theory on the topic. However, the small coefficient (-.0002) is
economically insignificant. The variable percentage of population 65 or above was negative and
significant at the 5% level with a sizeable coefficient (-.552), showing that states with larger
shares of senior citizens have lower poverty rates. Human Capital Attainment was positive and
significant at the 1% level, though its quadratic is negatively signed and equally significant.
Together, these variables inform us that poverty increases with a state's share of high school
graduates until the inflection point of 52.6%. To give this figure a point of reference, the average
of human capital attainment for the 21 year period is 48.3%. After passing the minimum, poverty
and human capital attainment become inversely related.

Economic Significance

With the statistical significance of vertical imbalances thus proven, our attention now
shifts onto the extent of its economic importance. The example given earlier of a state moving
from 0% to 21.3% VI was admittedly unrealistic, as American states are typically situated in the
10-30% range. It is rare for states to be on the beginning portion ofthe VI curve, where the
elasticity of poverty with respect to VI is greatest. Consequently, potential real-world reductions
in the poverty rate due to a movement towards the optimal VI level are decidedly modest. I use
the data points on VI for each sample state in 2000 in order to ascertain their most recent position
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on the curve. In this year, 36 states were operating below the optimal point, 9 states above, and 3
states on it. I then calculated what the difference in poverty rates would be if all 48 states were
instead operating at the minimum VI value. Multiplying these hypothetical poverty rates against
state populations gives us the reduced number of citizens living under the poverty line in this
scenario. The difference between observed values and fitted values shows reductions in poverty
that can be realized by converging upon the optimal VI value. For the year 2000, a total of
14,620 less people would be living under the poverty line if the government reallocated revenue
and expenditure shares optimally
Elevating only a few thousand people out of poverty in a national population of three
hundred million admittedly seems like a trivial achievement at first. However, it must be kept in
mind that these gains in social welfare can be attained by incurring little to no cost. All that is
required is the u.s. government brought all states into the ideal balance between own revenues
and own expenditures. Additionally, any gains in economic growth, human capital, and physical
capital accumulate and persist through time. Increases in these three macroeconomic variables
compound and serve to raise the standard ofliving for all generations indefinitely. Though the
)

levels of individuals exiting poverty may be small, the effect of increased economic growth and
capital could become more pronounced over time. Granted, this outcome is contingent upon the
theoretical channels through which fiscal decentralization reduces poverty being true.

Conclusion
Despite having proven the existence of a relationship between fiscal decentralization and
poverty in America, there is still a great deal left to find out on this topic. Our results tell us
nothing of the extent of social mobility achieved by individuals due to movements by their
government towards the optimal VI value. That is, we do not know how far above the poverty
line they ascended, nor how far below it they were to begin with. Similarly, our measures do not
inform us of movements by citizens upwards within the 'poverty zone' . It could very well be that
the severity of poverty was lessened for numerous individuals due to the effect of VI, even if
they were not able to escape poverty ultimately. Third, we are ignorant as to which demographic
groups benefit most from efficiently implemented fiscal decentralization. It remains to be seen
whether some populations are more sensitive to a movement towards the VI optimal value, such
as urban vs. rural, female vs. male, Hispanic vs. non-Hispanic, etc.
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All of these shortcomings can be fully addressed in further studies. More comprehensive
measures of poverty can be utilized in order to gain further insight into the effects caused by
fiscal decentralization / centralization. For example, the Squared Poverty Gap measure could be
employed to see what changes in standard of living those under the poverty line undergo. This
way it could be determined whether the poverty gap is increased or lessened on average. The
Watts Index is distinct in that it can be decomposed for different sub-populations, and would
allow us to gain insight into these trends. Secondly, more recent data can be gathered on states'
fiscal autonomy, in order that their positions on the VI curve could be best calculated. Then
meaningful policy recommendations could be given to public officials in order that they could
either centralize or decentralize their administrations in order to approximate the optimal VI
value. Third, the channels through which financial decentralization is thought to reduce poverty
could be empirically tested to determine whether theory holds up in the real world.
With respect to Channell: improved and expanded public goods and service, one could
look at project outcomes for social welfare programs to see if they do achieve more quantitative
success under an efficiently structured government. Changes in the size ofthe clientele base for
the same public programs would clearly indicate whether such initiatives are growing or
contracting in scope. For Channel 2: increased focus on human and physical capital, I plan on
gathering data on education share of government expenditures and standardized test scores to
examine changes in scholastic investment and quality, respectively. Studying the changes in
government spending on infrastructure and communications would inform us as to whether
optimally decentralized government indeed direct greater funds towards high-productivity
sectors.
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Appendix

)
Table 3

Pairwise Correlations
Revenue Indicator

Expenditure Indicator

Revenue Indicator

1.000

Expenditure Indicator

.0048

1.000

Vertical Imbalances

-.0074

-.0302

Vertical Imbalances

1.000
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